In Book X of the Republic, Plato states: “all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only anidote to them.” Plato believed that imitation of sensible objects removed the poet, and the observer, from truth and reality by inspiring the emotions of pity and fear. Plato argued that philosophical knowledge is far superior that the mere imitative nature of art.
Plato begins his discussion with the notion that “things are made for our use in accordance with the idea…and no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could he?” This person is a maker of appearances (painter) and particulars (carpenter) only, not reality, or universals. He continues by saying “that there is one who is the maker of all works of all other workmen”; this is God. The former of the three is the imitator of the true form created by the latter, and he is thrice removed from the idea; the truth. There is another dimension to this: the object imitated, let’s say in a painting, is an imitation of an appearance, not reality; therefore, the painter, or artist in general, is “a long way off the truth.”
No artist can know the depth and scope of everything (virtue/vice, divine shapes, etc.) because they are “creating” at such a level far removed from reality. Before imitation there must be knowledge: “a poet cannot compose well unless he knows his subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet.” Mind should be the artist and the body the medium. This knowledge lies in universals — in the forms; therefore, an artist must have a knowledge of the universals before he/she can attempt to sow them into a particular. This leads to another distinction: true art is rational while partaking of intelligence, while pseudo art is an inaccurate, emotional distraction.
The true artist is concerned with realities, not imitations. Plato asks: “Do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would seriously devote himself to the image making branch?” The answer is obviously no. “Instead of being the author of encomiums, he [the artist] would prefer to be the theme of them…that would be the source of much greater honor and profit.” Homer is used as an example of an imitator who left behind no practical proof that he was in possession of the truth, just appearances only. He knew not how things were used or made; therefore, he was not in possession of truth.
Without the true knowledge of what it is the artist is imitating, he/she will also be unable to judge whether or not their imitation is ontologically good or bad; or, more importantly, morally good or bad. Plato expounds that poetry can even hurt the good by bringing forward emotions that would usually be suppressed by the rationality of the intellect. “Now can we be right in praising and admiring another [the tragic hero] who is doing that which any one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?” One who is properly “restrained by reason” is above deigning to the emotions of pity and fear. Plato feels that we must rise above these petty emotions or they will control our state.
While Plato acknowledges the brilliance of Homer, he vociferously denies him a place in the state unless “she [poetry] make a defense of herself…and show herself useful to States and to human life.” Plato concludes that the only acceptable poetry are “hymns to the gods and praises of famous men,” for all other poetry cannot be “regarded seriously as attaining to the truth.” Therefore, anyone who seeks the truth must not indulge in picayune, emotional poetry, but must reach for the true Idea of Beauty found at the end of the ladder.
